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Abstract  
 
As more and more organisations and institutions are 
moving towards the e-learning strategy, the security 
issue becomes a big challenge. This paper addresses 
this challenge and works out a new mechanism to 
implement security modelling for e-learning. Under this 
new security modelling, e-learning systems can be 
better implemented by all stakeholders. 
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1. Introduction 
 
E-learning is becoming one of most important 
educational means. As more and more educational 
organisations are moving into e-learning, some 
organisations are pushing a uniform standard to 
facilitate e-learning implementation. Currently there are 
four main e-learning standard organisations: AICC [1], 
IEEE Learning Technology standards Committee [2], 
IMS Globe Consortium [3] and ADL [4].  
 
AICC is an international group of technology-based 
training professionals that creates CBT-related 
guidelines for the aviation industry. AICC publishes a 
variety of recommendations, but its standards with the 
most impact on the e-learning arena are its computer-
managed instruction (CMI) guidelines.  
 
IEEE is an international organization that develops 
technical standards and recommendations for electrical, 
electronic, computer and communication systems. 
Within the IEEE, the Learning Technology Standards 
Committee (LTSC) provides specifications that address 
best practices, which can be tested for conformance. 
Basically, they wrote the standard on how to write 
standards. The most widely acknowledged IEEE LTSC 
specification is the Learning Object Metadata (LOM) 
specification, which defines element groups and 
elements that describe learning resources.  
 
IMS Global Consortium is a consortium of suppliers 
that focus on the development of specifications that 
focus on the use of metadata to address content 
packaging. The specifications are used to define how an 
LMS communicates with back-end applications and 
content objects or libraries. Several of its standards are 
made available on its website at no fee.  
 
ADL is a U.S. government-sponsored organization that 
researches and develops specifications to encourage the 
adoption and advancement of e-learning. The most 
widely accepted ADL publication is the ADL Shareable 
Content Object Reference Model (SCORM). SCORM 
defines a Web-based learning 'Content Aggregation 
Model' and 'Run-Time Environment' for learning 
objects. SCORM is a collection of specifications 
adapted from best practices of various existing e-
learning standards to provide a comprehensive suite of 
e-learning capabilities that enable interoperability, 
accessibility and reusability of Web-based learning 
content. The SCORM specification combines the best 
elements of IEEE, AICC, and IMS specifications into a 
consolidated document. 
 
Many countries are trying to define their own e-learning 
standards/frameworks. Like Australia [5], a flexible 
learning framework is designed to support e-learning 
strategy.  European Union has Alliance of Remote 
Instructional Authoring and Distribution networks for 
Europe (ARIADE) [6] to support e-learning strategy.  
 
Almost all e-learning standards/frameworks are 
focusing on e-learning system design, course 
development and delivery, system interoperability and 
scalability.  The security concerns have not caused 
enough attention by these e-learning initiatives as many 
e-learning projects are still under the trials.  While more 
and more e-learning systems are formally used by 
educational institutions and more and more e-learning 
systems adopt open source technology, the e-learning 
security concerns become inevitable. The paper tries to 
systematically address right access control mechanism 
for e-learning.    
 
This paper is organised as the follows. Section 2 will 
discuss our recent contribution towards RBAC. Section 
3 will analyse specific roles and attributes which is 
much relevant to e-learning. Section 4 will address 
Architecture of security modelling for e-learning system. 
Section 5 will conclude the paper. 
 
2. Extended RBAC (ERBAC) 
 
The most fundamental concept of RBAC is the role. The 
role decides the security properties of information 
systems. It is important to do further research on the 
role. So far there are some further researches on the role, 
like environment role [7], parameterized role [8], and 
attributed role [9].  
 
In [7], the environment role is defined as a role which is 
use to capture environmental conditions. The 
environment role has extended the traditional RBAC 
with a new type of role. When the users get their roles, 
they have to get support from relevant environment 
roles so that they can successfully execute their assigned 
roles. In [8], a role is associated with a template. A role 
template is represented as follows: 
 
r(χ1, χ2, χ3, χ4, χ5,… χn) 
 
Where r is the role name and χ1, χ2, χ3, χ4, χ5, … χn are 
properties bound to the role, also called parameters of 
the role. In [9], the role attributes are defined, the notion 
of role attributes is very similar to the role parameters 
[5].  Unfortunately none of further research has been 
done to extend role attributes into RBAC. We are 
realising that the role attributes can be used to rebuild 
RBAC and to further enhance the central concept of the 
role. In the following sections, we will address the role 
attribute in details. The role attributes will have a big 
impact to current RBAC mechanism. Also the 
individual role’s privacy can also be protected by an 
effective implementation of role attributes.    
 
A role consists of various attributes which demonstrate 
the property of the role and the permissions the role 
holds. In order to clearly descript how the role attributes 
to have the impacts on current RBAC mechanism, we 
need a further discussion on the role attributes as 
follows. In order to clearly demonstrate our intention, 
this paper directly refers to some definitions from [10] 
as the follows. 
 
Definition of Attribute 
Definition 1 (Attribute) An attribute (Attr) is a property 
of a role (r). A set of relevant attributes consists of a 
role. A role has a fix set of attributes. The relationships 
between the role and the attribute are presented as 
follows: 
r(Attr)= r(Attr0, Attr1, …, Attrn) 
∀ Attri, Attrj ∈r, ni ≤≤0 , nj ≤≤0 : if ji ≠ , 
then Φ=∩ ji AttrAttr  
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If a system has a set of roles, R, R=R(r0, r1,  r2, …, rm),  
and ATTR is as a full set of attributes for the system, we 
will have the following relationship: 
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In order to use the role attributes to implement access 
control, we need to define more concepts to support this 
mechanism. 
 
Attributes types 
As the attributes are properties of a role, we define four 
types of attributes: compulsory, optional, obvious, and 
hidden. 
 
Compulsory  
Definition 2 (Compulsory Attribute (CA)) A 
compulsory attribute is an essential part of a role. If a 
compulsory attribute of a role is deactivated or a 
compulsory attribute has an empty value, the role 
cannot be assigned to any user and the role is also in a 
non-active situation.  
 
∀  Attrk ∈ATTR, zk ≤≤0 , z is the cardinality of 
ATTR 
  If r  of CAa  is Attr and r(Attr)Attr kk ∈  
Then )(Attrk Attrr↔  
 
 
Optional 
Definition 3 (Optional Attribute (OA)) An optional 
attribute is not an essential part of a role. If an OA of a 
role is deactivated or an OA has an empty value, the 
role can still be assigned to the users for a normal 
execution.  
 
∀  Attrk ∈ATTR, zk ≤≤0 , z is the cardinality of 
ATTR 
  If r  of OA an is Attr and r(Attr)Attr kk ∈  
Then )(Attrk Attrra  
 
Obvious  
Definition 4 (Obvious Attribute (ObA)) An obvious 
attribute of a role is visible to all other roles which have 
relationships with this role. ObA can be useful in the 
hierarchical RBAC and constraint RBAC.  ObA can be 
formulized as the follows: 
 
∀  Attrk ∈ATTR, zk ≤≤0 , z is the cardinality of 
ATTR 
  If  r of ObA an is Attr and (Attr)rAttr ikik ∈ and 
If ji ≠Φ≠ &rx  r
 ji Then kAttr is visible to rj 
 
 
Hidden 
Definition 5 (Hidden Attribute (HA)) A hidden attribute 
of a role is only visible to the role itself. It can be 
expressed as follows: 
∀  Attrk ∈ATTR, zk ≤≤0 , z is the cardinality of 
ATTR 
  If  r of ObA an is Attr and (Attr)rAttr ikik ∈ and 
If ji =Φ≠ &rx  r
 ji Then kAttr is visible to rj 
                                              Other kAttr is never 
visible to rj 
 
 
Role conformation 
Based on four role types, a role can be formed by only 
CA or CA as well as OA. Any CA can be ObA or HA. 
Any OA can also be ObA or HA. The role formation is 
shown at Figure 1. 
 
 
 
3. Security roles and attributes related to e-
learning 
When e-learning systems are needed for educational 
institutions, there are different stakeholders/interested 
parties involved, like developers, institutions, regulators, 
instructors, administration staff, supporting technicians, 
learners. It is important to classify the security roles and 
relevant attributes of all stakeholders respectively. 
 
Developers 
Developers are in charge of designing, building and 
testing e-learning system.  The attributes of developers’ 
role have to be included as the following table. 
 
 
 
 
                                      
Type selection 
 
 
Attributes name and 
description 
CA OA ObA HA 
System Security 
architecture design 
(D1) 
R N/A A U 
Access Control 
mechanism (D2) 
R N/A A U 
Privacy policy 
implementation (D3) 
R N/A A U 
Data integrity 
assurance (D4) 
R N/A A U 
Confidentiality 
assurance (D5) 
R N/A A U 
Availability 
assurance (D6) 
R N/A A U 
Identification 
mechanism (D7) 
R N/A A U 
Authentication 
assurance (D8) 
R N/A A U 
Accountability  
assurance (D9) 
R N/A A U 
Non-repudiation 
mechanism (D10) 
R N/A A U 
Cryptography 
implementation 
(D11) 
A A A U 
Copyright protection 
(D12) 
A A A A 
R-Required, N/A- Not applicable, A-Acceptable, U-
Unacceptable 
 
 
Institutions 
Institutions normally give a general requirement of e-
learning system. They might not be able to identify any 
specific security needs and their attributes for security 
are listed in the following table. 
 
 
 
 
 
          Type selection                     
 
 
 
Attributes name and 
description 
CA OA ObA HA 
System general security 
requirements (I1) 
R N/A A A 
Security policy (I2) R N/A A A 
Privacy policy (I3) R N/A A A 
Incident plan (I4) R N/A A A 
Disaster plan (I5) R N/A A A 
Figure 1 Role conformation 
r 
r(CA) 
r(CA,OA) 
r(ObA or HA) 
r(ObA or HA, ObA or HA) 
System continuity plan 
(I6) 
R N/A A A 
Identification policy 
(I7) 
R N/A A A 
Authentication policy 
(I8) 
R N/A A A 
Accountability  
hierarchy (I9) 
R N/A A A 
R-Required, N/A- Not applicable, A-Acceptable, U-
Unacceptable 
 
 
 
Regulators 
 
Regulators are in charge overall security and privacy 
policy through legislation. The security attributes of 
regulators are mainly included in the following table. 
       Type selection                               
 
Attributes name and 
description 
CA OA ObA H
A 
Security forensic 
legislation (R1) 
R N/A A U 
Privacy legislation (R2) R N/A A U 
R-Required, N/A- Not applicable, A-Acceptable, U-
Unacceptable 
 
 
 
E-learning system users 
 
Instructors are in charge of course production and 
delivery via e-learning system. Administration staff are 
in charge of administration functions of e-learning 
system, like student enrolments, etc. Supporting 
technicians are in charge of maintaining e-learning 
systems as the technical support. Learners are those who 
use e-learning systems to conduct their learning. As 
they are all e-learning system users, their security 
attributes depend on developers, institutions, and 
regulators. 
    Type 
selection                                  
 
 
Attributes 
name and 
description 
Instruct
or 
Learne
r
Admi
n 
staff 
Technicia
n 
System 
Security 
architecture 
design (D1) 
A A A R 
Access 
Control 
mechanism 
(D2) 
A A A R 
Privacy A A A R 
policy 
implementati
on (D3) 
Data integrity 
assurance 
(D4) 
A A A R 
Confidentialit
y assurance 
(D5) 
A A A R 
Availability 
assurance 
(D6) 
A A A R 
Identification 
mechanism 
(D7) 
A A A R 
Authenticatio
n assurance 
(D8) 
A A A R 
Accountabilit
y  assurance 
(D9) 
A A A R 
Non-
repudiation 
mechanism 
(D10) 
A A A R 
Cryptography 
implementati
on (D11) 
A A A R 
Copyright 
protection 
(D12) 
A A A R 
System 
general 
security 
requirements 
(I1) 
A N/A A R 
Security 
policy (I2) 
A N/A A R 
Privacy 
policy (I3) 
A  N/A A R 
Incident plan 
(I4) 
A N/A A R 
Disaster plan 
(I5) 
A N/A A R 
System 
continuity 
plan (I6) 
A N/A A R 
Identification 
policy (I7) 
A N/A A R 
Authenticatio
n policy (I8) 
A N/A A R 
Accountabilit
y  hierarchy 
(I9) 
A N/A A R 
Security 
forensic 
legislation 
(R1) 
A U A R 
Privacy 
legislation 
(R2) 
A U A R 
R-Required, N/A- Not applicable, A-Acceptable, U-
Unacceptable 
 
 
From the immediately previous table, the supporting 
technicians are taking a main security responsibility and 
the instructors and administration staff also significantly 
impact on the e-learning security. The students only 
impact on the e-learning system security via developers’ 
assignments. 
 
4. Architecture of security modelling for e-
learning system 
From the previous section, we have a clear picture of all 
stakeholders of e-learning systems and their security 
attributes directly impact on the security design, 
implementation and maintenance. Picture 2 shows the 
relationships and dependency of security architecture 
for e-learning systems. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the regulator’s security attributes 
will decide and influence the security attributes of e-
learning institutions. The institution’s security attributes 
will decide and influence the security attributes of e-
learning developers. The developer’s security attributes 
will decide and influence the security attributes of e-
learning technicians.   The technician’ security attributes 
will decide and influence the security attributes of e-
leaning instructors, administration staff and learner. The 
instructor’s security attributes and administration staff’s 
security attributes will decide and influence the security 
attributes of e-learning learners. 
 
5. Conclusion remarks 
This paper discusses the security attributes which are 
relevant to all e-learning stakeholders, regulator, 
institution, developer, instructor, administration staff, 
instructor and learners. A security modelling for e-
learning system illustrates the relationships among e-
learning stakeholders. This is still earlier stage to apply 
separated security attributes to overall e-learning system. 
More research needs to be done on how these security 
attributes can be effectively applied and connected with 
current e-learning standards, like AICC, IEEE LTSC, 
IMS, ADL, etc. We expect more research on the e-
learning security and privacy.  
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